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We investigate the impact of a change in the Czech early retirement scheme on the 
labor force participation of older male workers. Using the difference-in-differences 
method we find that a reduction in early retirement benefits by 2–3% leads to 
approximately the same decrease in the probability of being inactive. Our finding 
implies high elasticity of older male workers’ participation rate. The public policy 
implication is that a reduction in early retirement benefits can serve as a very 
effective tool to increase the participation of older men in the Czech labor market. 
 
 
JEL Codes: J21, J26. 
Keywords: Czech Republic, early retirement, labor market participation. 
                                                           
*  David Kocourek, Czech National Bank, External Economic Relations Division  
(e-mail: david.kocourek@cnb.cz); 
Filip Pertold, CERGE-EI (e-mail: filip.pertold@cerge-ei.cz). 
We have benefited from valuable comments by Sarah Smith, Róbert Ambriško, Zbyněk Štork, Daniel Münich, 
Štěpán Jurajda, Kamil Galuščák, Jan Kmenta, and participants at a CNB seminar, the EALE conference and the 
CSE conference. Filip Pertold worked on this paper as a research fellow at the Czech National Bank.  
All errors and omissions are ours. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily represent those of the Czech National Bank. 




The aging society is a crucial issue for the Czech Republic, and the Czech government has 
introduced various policy measures. In July 2001, penalization for early retirement with 
permanently cut benefits was increased and hence early retirement benefits were lowered after the 
change. 
Changes in early retirement schemes have been introduced in various countries. There is no full 
consensus in the recent literature on the final impact on the labor market behavior of older 
workers. Gruber and Wise (2002) provide a cross-country comparison of social security 
incentives and suggest that they play an important role in retirement and labor market decisions. 
Brinch et al. (2001) show that the introduction of the early retirement option has decreased the 
labor supply in Norway. On the other hand, Baker and Benjamin (1999) provide evidence from 
Canada and the USA where the reaction to changes in early retirement benefits was modest or 
even non-existent. Based on this literature we test the hypothesis that the change in early 
retirement benefits in the Czech Republic increased the labor market participation of older males. 
First, we quantify the real change in benefits and monetary incentives using various simulations. 
We use various indicators for representative individuals. We find a decrease in early retirement 
benefits by 2–3%; in terms of the net wage it is approximately 1–2%. We also computed social 
security wealth, accrual rate, peak value and option value as dynamic indicators of incentives to 
retire. Generally, we found that social security wealth from early retirement substantially 
decreased, but the optimal retirement age did not change substantially. 
After the reform, the social security statistics show a substantial decrease in the number of newly 
granted early retirement benefits. This suggests that the reform strongly affected labor market 
participation. To test this we use Czech Labor Force survey data and we employ the difference-in-
difference method (Baker and Benjamin, 1999) to evaluate the effect of reform on males’ labor 
market behavior. Our treatment group contains individuals who are eligible for early retirement 
benefits; younger individuals are in the control group.  
We find that a reduction in early retirement benefits by 2–3% leads to approximately the same 
decrease in the probability of being inactive. This finding was confirmed by various robustness 
checks. The results are not dependent on length and number of periods before and after the 
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1. Introduction 
As policy makers face the commonly known problem of an aging society, the labor supply of 
older workers becomes more important. The labor market decisions of older workers influence 
government expenditure on various social programs. For example, the way incentives to retire are 
formed is a crucial issue in keeping the pension system sustainable while the population is aging. 
Governments thus attempt to change the design of social security systems in order to respect 
demographic changes. 
The Czech Republic is an example of an aging society.
1 The Czech government has reacted to this 
development and has decreased the incentives to retire early created by the social security system. 
Policy makers expect this step to reduce the number of people who receive retirement benefits and 
at the same time increase the number of contributors to the pension system. These unambiguous 
advantages make this policy step popular also among many other governments facing the issue of 
aging.
2  
The policy relevance of this topic is reflected in the current empirical literature. There is no clear 
answer about the causal impact of retirement incentives on the labor supply of older workers.  
Cross-country comparisons show a strong negative relationship between early retirement 
incentives and labor force participation (Gruber and Wise, 1999, and Börsch-Supan, 2000). Papers 
examining changes in national policies suggest that the introduction of early retirement benefits as 
a specific form of retirement incentive decreases labor force participation (e.g. Brinch et al., 
2001). 
By contrast, other studies do not find clear evidence about the sensitivity of the labor supply of 
older workers to changes in the early retirement scheme. For example, Baker and Benjamin 
(1999) provide evidence from the USA and Canada which shows a relatively modest or non-
existent reaction of the labor supply to changes in the early retirement scheme. Similarly, Moffitt 
(1987) finds relatively small effects of social security law on the labor supply of older workers in 
the USA.  
There are only a few papers about the labor supply of Czech workers. Direct evidence concerning 
the labor supply of older workers is provided in Galuščák (2002) and Bičáková et al. (2008). 
Galuščák (2002) shows that the introduction of an earnings test, which imposed a benefit 
eligibility constraint on working pensioners, led to a significant and substantial decrease in the 
participation rate of workers who had reached statutory retirement age, whereas Bičáková et al. 
(2008) estimated the effect of tax changes on the labor supply of average Czech workers as being 
relatively modest. There is no direct evidence about the causal impact of early retirement 
incentives and the participation of older workers.  
                                                           
1 According to the projection of the Czech Statistical Office, the share of people aged 60 years and over will 
double in the next 30 years. Babecký and Dybczak (2009) try to model this aging scenario using an OLG model. 
2 It needs to be emphasized that the overall fiscal balance is improved unless retirees are proportionally 
compensated for longer service and unless employees leave the labor market and become unemployed or accept 
disability social assistance and/or become recipients of support from other social programs.  
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Retirement incentives can take various forms: explicit and implicit taxation and/or legal rules that 
restrict full-time work at a certain age. In our case we investigate the effect of reducing early 
retirement benefits, which are offered as non-labor income for individuals three years before the 
statutory retirement age. The policy change became effective in July 2001 and cut early retirement 
benefits by approximately 3% for new claimants. To illustrate this we also compare several 
incentive measures before and after the reform.  
The social security statistics show that one year after the policy change, the number of new early 
retirees had decreased by half. This suggests that the direct impact of this policy step was strong. 
However, as we describe in the next section, older workers face several options regarding how to 
become non-employed (retire early
3, become unemployed, or enter disability retirement
4). The 
positive causal effect of the policy change on the labor supply of older workers is under question.  
In order to find the causal impact of the policy step, we use the difference-in-differences 
estimation method. The treatment group includes workers who are eligible for early retirement 
benefits (at least three years before the statutory retirement age). The control group contains 
workers who are just about to enter the eligibility age window for early retirement. The eligibility 
age window for entering early retirement starts three years before the statutory retirement age. In 
particular, a probit model is used for testing whether the policy change affects the participation 
rate of individuals who are eligible for early retirement, controlling for other characteristics of the 
individuals. 
Our analysis shows that this policy increased the probability of a male participating in the labor 
market by 2–3% for those eligible for early retirement. This paper is organized as follows. The 
next section provides a detailed insight into the social security system in the Czech Republic. The 
official statistics and simulations of the policy change on individuals are described in section 3. 
Section 4 covers the data description of the treatment and control group. A graphical overview is 
presented in section 5, the econometric methodology is explained in section 6, and the results are 
described in section 7. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Setting 
The Czech retirement scheme is a standard pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system with mandatory 
participation for all employees and the self-employed as well. The basic features of the Czech 
pension system were inherited from the system run under the communist regime. A few 
legislative changes were implemented in the years after the fall of communism, but the basic 
features remained unchanged. The statutory retirement age is different for male and female 
workers; the retirement age of the latter depends on the number of children raised. Beside this 
differentiation the retirement age has been prolonged by two months for males and four months 
for females per year after 1996 to the year the male or female was supposed to retire under the 
                                                           
3 The exact preconditions for early retirement are described in Act No. 155/1995 Coll. 
4 To enter disability retirement certain health criteria have to be met. Hence, it is not a free choice of the 
individual.             The Impact of Early Retirement Incentives on Labor Market Participation: 
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former conditions. The retirement age for males in 1996 was set at 60 years.5 The retirement age 
for females without children was 57 and each child raised reduces the retirement age by one year. 
At the time of the policy change the average eligibility age was approximately 61. 
Pension benefits are computed based on a formula that has an individual part (a percentage 
adjustment) and a part which is the same for all workers (the basic amount). The basic amount is 
the amount of money – laid down by law – that is received by everybody who is an old-age 
pension recipient. It can be understood as the minimum pension. The individual part contains 
individual-specific characteristics, such as the worker’s earning history since 1986 and number of 
years in service. The wage history, which is indexed to the current value, influences the amount of 
the personal assessment base (PAB), which is basically the sum of wages, indexed to the current 
value, divided by the number of years for which the PAB is counted. The PAB is further worked 
with and is modified by reduction borders and reduction percentages to a calculation base (CB). 
The CB represents the crucial step in the Czech pension formula and causes a high degree of 
redistribution in the system. The number of years in service influences the size of the adjustment 
percentage (AP) and therefore the size of the percentage of the CB which will be counted as the 
percentage-based assessment (PA) in the pension formula. The longer an individual is in service, 
the higher the PA and therefore the higher the pension benefit will be. The exact formula can be 
found in Annex 1. 
This formula is applied to every kind of retirement benefits, including early retirement benefits.
6 
The early retirement benefits are lower than the standard ones, because they are reduced by an 
adjustment coefficient (rPYI), which was subject to the policy change. In particular, the “penalty” 
for early retirement before the reform was 0.6% and 0.3%
7 per each 90 days remaining to the 
standard retirement age before the policy was introduced. The policy step changed the degree of 
penalization for early retirement. In fact, both rates that adjust early retirement benefits (0.6% and 
0.3%) were increased to 0.9%. For example, considering an individual who retires one year before 
her retirement age (a 0.6% reduction applied before the reform), the adjustment percentage of her 
benefit decreased after the reform by 1.2 percentage points.  
                                                           
5 After that there is no single retirement age for the male population in a given year. The exact formulation is that 
the retirement age is prolonged by two months for each initiated age-year after December 31, 1995 before the 
individual reaches the age of 60. In practice this means that if a worker is 60 in February 2000, then his 
retirement age is 60 plus ten months. Therefore, the men from this example will retire in January 2001. 
6 The Czech social security scheme recognizes two types of early retirement. One is with permanently cut 
benefits, which allows individuals to retire at most three years before the eligibility age and the individual is not 
allowed to work after retiring. The decreased pension benefits are collected for the rest of the individual’s life. 
The second is early retirement with temporarily cut benefits, which allows the individual to retire at most two 
years before the eligibility age and is tied to unemployment status for half of the year at least. The decreased 
pension benefits are recalculated when the eligibility age is reached and increased to the level as if one had 
retired at the eligibility age. Apart from that, two more ways of escaping employment status are available: 
becoming unemployed and becoming disabled. However, social support for disabled people is strictly tied to the 
health situation of the individual and hence cannot be regarded as a fully free choice of the individual, though it 
can be influenced by the individual exerting pressure on the doctor who makes the decision about the disability 
pension.  
7 A special case is an individual who applies for early retirement benefits and is aged 60 or more. The permanent 
penalty is then just 0.3% per each 90 days before the standard retirement age. 6   David Kocourek and Filip Pertold 
 
This decrease in the adjustment percentage proportionally decreases the pension benefit and hence 
has an influence on the motivation of workers to stay active on the Czech labor market until the 
statutory retirement age.  
Table 1 shows the drop in officially newly granted early retirement benefits. The fall was 
approximately 10 percentage points of regular pension benefits. This observed change is most 
likely caused by two effects. The first one is driven by the change in early retirement benefits. The 
second one is driven by a change in the characteristics of workers who applied for early retirement 
before and after the policy step. 
 
 
Table 1: Newly Granted Pensions (in CZK) 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
(1)  all  pensions  5,991 6,106 6,399 7,055 7,224 7,760 8,391 
(2)  at  retirement  age  6,222 6,485 6,823 7,226 7,512 7,968 8,693 
(3)  after  retirement  age  7,272 7,485 7,916 8,621 9,157 9,410 10,306 
(4)  early  retirement  –  temporarily  cut  5,370 5,513 5,838 5,917 6,224 6,404 6,836 
(5) early retirement – permanently cut  5,593 5,659 5,844 5,667 5,996 6,261 6,984 
(5)/(2)  (in  %)  90 87 86 78 80 79 80 
 
Source: MoLSA (2006), own computation of averages. 
 
 
The comparison of newly granted early retirement benefits before and after the reform does not 
provide a clear picture about the effect of the policy on benefits. It is probable that workers who 
applied for early retirement after the reform had stronger preferences toward leisure than workers 
who applied before the reform, and they might also have had different working histories
8, which 
determine their benefits. Therefore, we attempt to isolate the pure policy change effect from the 
self-selection effect. For that purpose we create several typical individuals with different wage 
histories, which serve – together with length of service – as a major input for the computation of 
benefits. 
We also compute the early retirement benefits before and after the change for individuals with 
virtually the same characteristics. The only parameter that changes is the degree of penalization, 
which was subject to the policy change. Our computations show that the net decrease in early 
retirement benefits was approximately 2–3% (CZK 120–250 per month in absolute terms). The 
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Table 2: Changes in Early Retirement Benefits Due to the Policy Change 
  Years before 




Relative decrease in early 
retirement benefit 
before/after (in %) 
Change in terms of net 
wage (in percentage 
points) 
T-3 191  -3  -2.4 
T-2 133  -2  -1.6 
70% of 
avg. 
wage  T-1 131  -2  -1.1 
T-3 218  -3  -1.9 
T-2 149  -2  -1.3  Avg. 
Wage  T-1 152  -2  -1.3 
T-3 237  -3  -1.3 
T-2 162  -2  -0.9 
150% of 
avg. 
wage T-1  166  -2  -0.9 
Source: Own computation based on the official formula published in MoLSA (2002).  
Note:    Benefits are computed for 46 years of service. The net wage is CZK 11,324 in 2001. Three income        
groups were chosen arbitrarily. 70% of the average wage reflects approximately the group of 
workers with the median wage and 150% of the average wage represents managers and high-paid 
workers in the Czech economy. 
 
The ratio of the net wage to early retirement benefits (the net replacement rate) decreased by 0.9–
2.4 percentage points. Generally, the highest decrease applied to those who wanted to enter early 
retirement three years before the eligibility age. Lower-income workers were penalized relatively 
more than upper-income groups. This is a result of the pension formula: benefits are relatively 
higher for low-income than for high-income workers. This implies that the policy change affected 
more strongly individuals who face a relatively disadvantaged position on the labor market. 
Another way to assess the effect of this policy change is suggested in Börsch-Supan (2000). The 
author stresses the importance of the time dimension – how much it is worth to give up one year 
of retirement in terms of net benefit or social security wealth (SSW) computed as the difference 
between the expected discounted stream of all future benefits and social security taxes paid, which 
are computed as a percentage of gross earnings. The SSW formula, which states how to compute 






− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ =
1









S W c S t R B S t R SSW δ π δ π  
with: 
SSW  – social security wealth, 
S  – planning age, 
R  – planned retirement age, 
E  – expected age of death at age S, 
) | ( S t π  – probability of being alive at age t conditional on being alive at age S, 
) (R Bt  – pension at age t for retirement at age R, 
t W  – wage at age t, 
δ  – discount factor, 
c  – social security contribution rate. 
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SSW is very sensitive to many assumptions.
9 We employ the values for the discount factor and 
wage growth
10 from Coile and Gruber (2007) to keep the analysis consistent with the analysis of 
peak value (Coile and Gruber, 2007) and option value (Stock and Wise, 1990). In our computation 
of SSW we do not assume any indexation formula. The process of indexation in the Czech 
Republic depends very much on government discretion, as described in Dušek (2007) and Dušek 
and Kopecsni (2008). 
Table 3 shows the basic computations of retirement incentives employing the lifetime budget 
constraint. 
 
Table 3: Monetary Incentives before and after the Reform (Average Earner) 










Accrual rate – 
before 
Accrual rate – 
after 
57 0.837  0.828  521,199  514,908  0.037  0.041 
58 0.870  0.864  541,335  536,974  0.036  0.040 
59 0.906  0.903  561,633  559,274  -0.003  0.001 
60 0.936  0.936  559,937  559,937  -0.112  -0.112 
61 0.964  0.964  503,717  503,717  -0.097  -0.097 
62 1.012  1.012  459,384  459,384  -0.139  -0.139 
63 1.037  1.037  403,161  403,161  -0.100  -0.100 
64 1.105  1.105  366,359  366,359  -0.149  -0.149 
Note: SSW – social security wealth – is defined as the sum of all discounted pension benefits and social 
security contributions. The accrual rate is defined as the relative year-to-year change in SSW. 
 
Each row corresponds to the age at which a worker enters retirement. In this exercise we assume 
for the sake of simplicity that the statutory retirement age is 60. This means that everybody who 
enters retirement before the age of 60 is in early retirement regime and the worker is eligible for 
early retirement benefits at 57.  
Comparing SSW before and after the reform, one can see a substantial decrease in SSW for those 
who enter early retirement. The second implication of the reform is that SSW peaked at 59 before 
the reform, whereas SSW at 60 (the statutory retirement age) and at 59 is almost the same after 
the reform. This is also reflected in the accrual rate, which shows a relative change in SSW if 
retirement is postponed by one year.  
Postponing retirement to 59 increases social security wealth and hence motivates potential retirees 
to stay on the labor market. The effect of the reform is that the accrual, even though very low, is 
positive even at age 60, which introduces the motivation to stay on the labor market one more 
year. This effect depends very much on the wage history. Employees with higher wages 
contribute to the social system more than is the increase in the future pension benefits and hence 
their accrual at age 60 is negative both before and after the reform, but nevertheless is smaller. 
                                                           
9 Assumptions regarding the individual discount rate, the future indexation of benefits under PAYG, the interest 
rate path, wage growth, etc. 
10 For simplicity we assume the same wage growth for all income groups. 
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A forward-looking approach to assessing the incentives created by the pension system can be 
studied using peak value and option value. Peak value (Coile and Gruber, 2007)is defined as all 
discounted benefits from entering retirement. In fact, it is maximized when SSW reaches its 
maximum. We performed this analysis and it obviously supports the preceding analysis that the 
reform has increased the incentives for the average earner to stay on the labor market. The second 
approach to assessing financial incentives is the option value model (Stock and Wise, 1990). The 
option value attempts to evaluate the optimal retirement age in utility terms and involves 
calculating the forgone earnings that could have been earned on the labor market. It is defined as 
the change in utility that results from working to the optimal age, which is determined by 
maximizing the lifetime utility over consumption and leisure. The problem of this approach is that 
one needs to employ certain assumptions about wage profile in the final career stage.  
We employ the standard assumption of a linear wage profile, which is not necessarily a realistic 
assumption. Our results are summarized in Annex 2 and suggest that according to the option value 
the optimal retirement age was not changed by the reform and is at the statutory retirement age. 
However, we leave a more detailed analysis for further research. 
One of the questions that this reform raised is what margin of the labor supply is affected, and in 
particular whether the reform affected the extensive or intensive margin of the labor supply of 
older workers. The extensive margin is affected only since the labor code restricts early retirement 
benefits: people who retire earlier (claim early retirement benefits) are not allowed to work at all.  
 
3. Data Description and Treatment and Control Group 
For the purposes of our research we use Czech Labor Force Survey data from 1998–2005 
containing detailed information about the labor market status of a representative sample of 60,000 
individuals and their households. On a rotating panel base, individuals and their households are 
surveyed during five consecutive quarters. Therefore, one fifth of the sample is replaced every 
quarter. We choose the subsample of males who are in the age window of six to zero years until 
the statutory standard retirement age. Hence, our sample includes 50,152 observations for 11,843 
individuals. Summary statistics for the treatment and control groups can be found in Annex 3. 
We divide this sample into four time periods – one period before the reform and three periods 
after the reform. Participation in the survey is restricted to up to five quarters. Within this period, 
we do not observe a sufficient number of changes in labor market status, thus we treat our sample 
as repeated cross-sectional data. The reason we choose only one period before the policy change 
is the low stability of the social security system: the legal system was stable for only two years 
before the policy change and approximately four years after the policy change. Our time span also 
reflects the comparability of the data. We define four consecutive periods, each 1.5 years long. 
The first is before the policy change (1Q2000–2Q2001), the second is immediately after the 
policy change (3Q2001–4Q2002), the third is from 1Q2003 to 2Q2004, and the fourth covers 
3Q2004–4Q2005. We also try alternative time spans, but this does not change our results 
significantly (see Annex 5). This division of the total time span into four periods covers the most 10   David Kocourek and Filip Pertold 
 
institutionally stable period before and after the reform. On top of that, the results for several time 
periods after the reform confirm that the impact of the policy change is the same over time.  
The important problem is the actual eligibility age, which has been lengthening by two months per 
year and gives additional noise to our data. To diminish this problem we calculate the individual 
eligibility age as defined by law. For that purpose we have to approximate the actual age of the 
respondents in the Labor Force Survey, because the survey per se does not provide information 
about the exact actual age (the accuracy is yearly frequency). Thus, we use only those individuals 
for which we observe a change in age during the period they were surveyed (Galuščák, 2002). 
Using these individuals we approximate the exact individual age at an accuracy of one quarter and 
calculate the actual individual statutory retirement age. Based on this approximation we can also 
calculate the number of years to retirement. This makes our analysis more accurate and allows us 
to disentangle the effect of the early retirement change from the prolonging of the retirement age. 
Using the number of years to the statutory retirement age we define the treatment and control 
groups. The treatment group contains people who are eligible for early retirement: up to three 
years before their standard retirement age. The younger individuals (more than three years before 
the eligibility age) are in the control group, because they were not directly affected by the policy. 
The relatively broad definition of the treatment group allows us to capture all individuals who 
were eligible for early retirement and could make the decision during the entire period of three 
years before reaching the eligibility age. The disadvantage is that in the period after the policy 
change the treatment group consists of two types of retirees: men who entered early retirement in 
the old system and those who entered in new system. This is reflected in our analyses and we 
interpret the results with respect to this fact. 
The LFS data contain information about individual characteristics that are important for our 
analysis. For the purposes of our analysis we used the following characteristics: education, family 
status, number of persons in the household, and geographical location. The data do not include 
any information about wages or retirement benefits.  
 
3. Graphical Overview  
As we described above, the change in the early retirement scheme increases the incentive to stay 
in the labor market. As a preview of our results we present the official statistics of newly granted 
pensions (Figure 1). The share of newly granted pensions for this particular pension scheme 
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Figure 1: Newly Entitled Pensions (Men) 
 
This suggests that this reform could have a strong impact on the labor market decision. However, 
the total impact on the participation rate can be questioned, because the share of the other options 
for early exit could be used, as can be seen in Figure 1.  
Further, we present the behavior of individuals using the Labor Force Survey described above. 
Figure 2 depicts the participation rate of the control and treatment groups during 1998–2005. The 
participation rate of the treatment group increased by around ten percentage points between 2001 
and 2004. The participation rate also increased in comparison with the control group. This 
suggests that our treatment group was subject to a specific shock that did not affect the control 
group. One can observe that this increase continued at a lower rate even during the period from 
the second half of 2003 to almost the end of 2004. It also contains the effect of the policy change, 
because in the first period after the policy change, the treatment group still contains older cohorts 
that entered early retirement before the policy change and remain in the treatment group. Due to 
data limitations and the institutional set-up, we cannot define the treatment group more precisely 
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Figure 2: Participation Rate of Control and Treatment Group in 1998 - 2005 
 
Source:  Labor Force Survey, own calculation. 
In Figure 4 we can see how the participation rate changes over time in different years to/after 
retirement age. This quasi-cohort approach shows that the participation rate during the early 
retirement window (between -3 and 0) is the lowest in the period before the reform was 
introduced. Moreover, the trend that we observe in Figure 4 is clearly increasing. The difference 
between the pre-reform period and the last period studied at one year before the statutory 
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Figure 3: Participation Rate in Different Distances to/after Eligibility Age 
 
Source: Labor Force Survey, own calculation. 
 
We also present an alternative indicator – the hazard rate – representing the probability of labor 
force withdrawal due to retirement. Figure 4 depicts the hazard rates for two periods: before and 
after the policy change. In the cross-sectional setting, the definition of the hazard rate is one minus 
the retention rate, which is the participation rate of workers at age t divided by the participation 
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Figure 4: Hazard Rates in Different Distances to/after Eligibility Age 
 
Source: Labor Force Survey, own calculation. 
 
The line representing the first period before the policy change has two peaks: the first one (around 
-2, two to three years before the eligibility age) reflects entering early retirement before the policy 
change, while the second (around 0) represents entering standard retirement. The line for the 
period three years after the policy change shows a substantial change in the behavior of retirees. 
One can see the hazard rate smoothed over the number of years before/after retirement. Although 
early retirement frequently occurs, one cannot observe any particular peak before the standard 
eligibility age in the period starting with the third quarter of 2004. This is most probably an effect 
of the treatment we study. One can also see that it is also more common to retire after the 
eligibility age. This is in line with the hypothesis that workers generally stay longer in their jobs. 
We also consider the problem of unemployment, which can potentially change over time and 
therefore raise questions about our results. Figure 5 shows the development of the unemployment 
rate over time. The trend in unemployment is not clear, despite an upward movement of 
unemployment in the treatment group right after the policy change. However, one needs to be 
aware that the number of unemployed individuals in our sample is relatively small and this change 
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Figure 5: Unemployment Rate 
 
Source: Labor Force Survey, own calculation. 
 
This graphical overview suggests that our treatment group was hit by an external shock around the 
year 2001 which influenced its participation in the labor market. We believe that this shock was 
with high probability the change in the early retirement setting. This is, of course, not a rigorous 
analysis, because we cannot say whether the shift in participation in the labor market is 
statistically significant. The next sections thus provide a formal econometric analysis and 
computation of the increase in the probability of staying in the labor force. 
 
5. Methodology of Econometric Analysis 
As an identification strategy we use difference-in-differences (Baker and Benjamin, 1999). The 
treatment group includes workers who are eligible for early retirement benefits (up to at least 
three years before the actual retirement age). The control group contains workers who are closer 
to the statutory retirement age. The time periods chosen for the estimation are the following: 1.5 
years before the policy change and 4.5 years after the policy change, divided into three periods of 
equal length. The increase in the total number of early retirement benefits was dramatic in the late 
1990s. We do not want to mix the previous changes in the social security system into our analysis, 
so we use only one period before the policy as a benchmark for our analysis. The basic 
specification is the following: 
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where  it y is one if an individual i is inactive (out of the labor force) at time t and zero when an 
individual is active in the same period.  it OLD  is a dummy in the treatment group – three to zero 
years before the retirement age.  it AFTER1 ,  it AFTER2  and it AFTER3  are dummy variables for 
the three consecutive periods (1.5 years long) after the policy change. The period before the 
policy change is defined as 1.5 years before the policy change became effective.  it X is the vector 
of observable individual characteristics (basic demographic characteristics: education, number of 
people in the household, marital status, geographical location) and it ε  is the error term. This 
model is estimated by a probit model with the standard maximum likelihood estimation technique. 
The estimated coefficient  1 β  captures all differences between the treatment and control groups 
that are unrelated to the policy change.  2 β ,  3 β and  4 β capture all the period-specific changes that 
influence the probability of being employed for the control and treatment groups. 5 β ,  6 β  and  7 β  
are the coefficients of interest. They reflect the impact of the policy change on the inactivity of the 
treatment group relative to the control group. The vector of coefficients 8 β  captures the influence 
of major demographic characteristics. 
 
6. Results  
Our final sample contains 50,152 observations, 26,735 from the treatment group and 23,417 from 
the control group. The estimated coefficients indicate that the treatment significantly increased the 
labor supply of the treatment group. The coefficients have the expected sign; however, the first 
period after the change does not have a significant impact on the labor supply. The reason is that 
our treatment group also contains people who entered early retirement under the previous system. 
Therefore, the pass-through to the participation rate of the treatment group is lagged and becomes 
visible only in periods  2 AFTER  and  3 AFTER . 5 β  is not significant in our specification, and  6 β  
together with  7 β   are negative and significant. After controlling for other observable 
characteristics, the results change mainly in the significance of the coefficients. The other controls 
are significant with the expected signs: higher education decreases the probability of being 
inactive. The number of household members has the same effect. We do not include the labor 
market status of spouses, because the labor market activity of spouses can also potentially be 
affected by the reform and thus it is an endogenous variable. To reveal the magnitude of the 
estimated effects – the impact on the probability – the marginal effects are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Estimated Coefficients from the Probit Model in Three Different Specifications  
 
Model (1)  (2)  (3) 
OLD*AFTER1  -0.0159 -0.0108  -0.0096 
 (0.0180)  (0.0182)  (0.0182) 
OLD*AFTER2  -0.0509*** -0.0340*  -0.0318* 
 (0.0179)  (0.0184)  (0.0184) 
OLD*AFTER3  -0.0457** -0.0354*  -0.0317 
 (0.0187)  (0.0189)  (0.0191) 
Personal characteristics    X  X 
District dummies      X 
N 50,152  50,152  50,152 
Pseudo R-squared  0.07  0.10  0.14 
Note: Coefficients are recalculated into the probability measure (min 0, max 1). The excluded variables are 
dummies for: control group, one period before policy change, interaction of control group and all 
periods. Full results are presented in Annex 4. Standard errors are in parentheses. We also performed 
linear probability estimation with OLS and it does not change the significance of the results. 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We estimated three different specifications. The most extended version contains individual 
characteristics and 76 dummies for districts. In all models this effect remains negative. The 
marginal effect of the reform on the probability of being inactive is close to -0.03, which can be 
interpreted as a 3% drop in the probability of being inactive for workers who are at most three 
years before the eligibility age. These results show that inactivity significantly decreased in the 
treatment group during 2003–2005 relative to the control group and the period before. Our results 
also show that there is no significant effect of the policy change in the period immediately after 
the policy change. This is probably due to the fact that the left-hand-side variable is a stock (the 
probability of being inactive) and thus the treatment group in the first period after the policy 
change contains a lot of individuals who entered early retirement before the policy change.  
We are also aware of the problem with expectations, which might have influenced the behavior of 
people right before the reform became effective. In our case it would mean that people entered 
early retirement earlier just because the policy change occurred. This fact would bias our results. 
We cannot fully account for this phenomenon owing to data limitations. Thus, we did a robustness 
check and skipped the first half of 2001, since the law introducing the reform was passed in the 
Czech parliament at the beginning of 2001 and became effective in July 2001. We thus shorten 
the baseline period to one year. The results are summarized in Table 5 and suggest that even in 
this setting the reform decreased the inactivity rate among older workers. The size of this effect is, 
however, smaller and in specifications (2) and (3) the significance has vanished. However, the 
result for specification (1) could be considered as the lower bound of the estimated effect, because 
those people who reacted purely to the announcement of the reform would probably have entered 
early retirement later on if they behave rationally. 
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Table 5: Estimated Coefficients from the Probit Model in Three Different Specifications 
without the First Half of 2001 
Model (1)  (2)  (3) 
OLD*AFTER1  -0.0004 0.0034  0.0031 
 (0.0209)  (0.0211)  (.02104) 
OLD*AFTER2  -0.0361* -0.0201  -0.0197 
 (0.0196)  (0.0201)  (0.0201) 
OLD*AFTER3  -0.0308 -0.0214  -0.0193 
 (0.0204)  (0.0206)  (0.0207) 
Personal characteristics    X  X 
District dummies      X 
N 46,127  46,127  46,127 
Pseudo R-squared  0.06  0.11  0.13 
Note: Coefficients are recalculated into the probability measure (min 0, max 1). The excluded variables are 
dummies for: control group, one period before policy change, interaction of control group and all 
periods. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The dummies that represent geographical location show high variation in labor market behavior 
across different regions in the Czech Republic. For example, individuals from the Karvina region 
have a 40% higher chance of being inactive compared to individuals from Prague, even after 
controlling for all possible observable characteristics. 
Our results show that the probability of being inactive (out of the labor force) has decreased since 
the reform came into force. This means that people have not started to leave the labor force by 
using other social programs (e.g. disability pensions), but this leaves the possibility of becoming 
unemployed and so this policy change might still have a negative impact on the fiscal position. 
Therefore, we decided to run the same probit specification but with the indicator variable of being 
employed. The results, available in Annex 6, are quite similar to those obtained earlier.  
We also attempt to use an explanatory variable that indicates change in labor market status. 
However, as we mentioned earlier, we face a problem with a lack of observations for people who 
change status during the period they were surveyed (i.e., four or five quarters). We divided our 
time span into two periods: two years before the reform and two years after the reform. We 
observed only a few changes in labor market status for the treatment group: 172 out of 2,541 
individuals for the two years before the policy change and 113 out of 2,587 after the policy 
change. We can conclude that these numbers are in line with our hypothesis that the reduction in 
early retirement benefits caused fewer workers to enter early retirement. However, the number of 
observations in our sample does not allow any formal econometric analysis in this setting. 
 
7. Conclusions and Policy Implications  
Our results confirm that the 2–3% cut in early retirement benefits due to the 2001 reform boosted 
the labor participation of males eligible for early retirement by approximately the same amount. 
The reform increased the probability of being employed in the three-year period before a worker 
reaches the statutory standard retirement age. These results show that the elasticity of the    The Impact of Early Retirement Incentives on Labor Market Participation:             
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extensive margin of labor supply of older Czech workers is relatively high, although we are not 
able to calculate the exact value because we lack individual data on wages.  
Our findings are generally in line with those, for example, from Germany, where Börsch-Supan 
(2000) found a high sensitivity of older workers’ employment to the social security system design. 
Our results also correspond with Galuščák (2002), who found a substantially high sensitivity of 
the participation rate to change in the earnings test for workers older than the statutory retirement 
age. In this respect, our results are not fully comparable, because we examine older workers who 
are eligible for early retirement and have not reached the statutory retirement age.  
In our approach, we assume that the difference in the labor supply between older and younger 
cohorts was not affected by any other shock than the policy change. This is the only possible way 
of empirically testing a public policy intervention affecting the whole population of one country. 
The extent of our analyses is also limited by data availability. The dataset contains important 
characteristics about the retirement of males and – on top of that – it does not contain wages. 
Therefore, our analysis does not cover the labor supply of females and we do not directly estimate 
the elasticity of the labor supply to the individual budget constraint. Our results also indicate high 
differences of labor supply behavior across males with different characteristics (education, 
geographic location). This could be the subject of additional research. 20   David Kocourek and Filip Pertold 
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Annex 1: Social Security Formulae 
PA BA P + =  
 
AP CB PA ⋅ =  
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P – pension benefit  
BA – basic amount 
PA – percentage-based assessment 
CB – calculation base 
AP – adjustment percentage 
PAB – personal assessment base 
rp1 = 100%, rp2 = 30%, rp3 = 10% – reduction percentage 
rbj = first and second reduction border in yearly terms 
IPj, j = 1, 2 – insured period (j = 1) and compensatory insured period (j = 2) counted as 80% of 
the length before reaching the age of 18 (only whole 365 days are included) 
PYI – percentage for each year of insurance (1.5%) 
90per – number of 90-day periods 
rPYI – reduced percentage for each 90-day period of early retirement (subject of policy change) 
AAB – annual assessment bases 
EP – excluded period 
CGGAB – coefficient of the growth of the general assessment base 
GAB – general assessment bases 
RC – recalculation coefficient 
Y – year   The Impact of Early Retirement Incentives on Labor Market Participation:             
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Annex 2: Forward-looking Social Security Incentives 
 
 
Forward-looking Social Security Incentives 
Before the change  After the change 
Peak value  Option value  Peak value  Option value  Ret. age 
Avg.  wage SD Avg.  wage  SD  Avg.  wage SD Avg.  wage  SD 
55 27,764  6,689 10,560 2,671 32,145 7,137 10,560 2,671
56 34,212  4,584  8,080 2,293 38,664 5,015 8,080 2,293
57 40,434  2,522  6,953 1,847 45,029 2,947 6,953 1,847
58 20,298  1,048  3,996 1,252 22,963 1,704 3,996 1,252
59 -1,695  3,436  2,484 306 664 3,205 2,484  306
60 -56,221  10,848  0 0 -56,221 10,848 0  0
61 -44,332  3,409  5,333 1,161 -44,332 3,409 5,582 1,180
62 -56,223  6,237  14,187 2,748 -56,223 6,237 14,653 2,788
63 -36,801  6,750  23,539 4,341 -36,801 6,750 24,220 4,398
64 -47,407  6,681  30,560 6,063 -47,407 6,681 31,228 6,118
65     38,080 7,915  38,742  7,968
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Annex 3: Descriptive Statistics – Control and Treatment Group 
 
Descriptive Statistics – Control Group 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
inactivity status  0.17  0.38 0 1
elementary 0.09  0.29 0 1
apprenticeship 0.54  0.50 0 1
high school  0.24  0.43 0 1
lower tertiary  0.01  0.10 0 1
upper tertiary  0.11  0.32 0 1
unmarried 0.04  0.21 0 1
married 0.84  0.37 0 1
widowed 0.04  0.20 0 1
divorced 0.07  0.26 0 1
before 0.22  0.42 0 1
after1 0.24  0.43 0 1
after2 0.28  0.45 0 1
after3 0.26  0.44 0 1
# of household members  2.60  1.07 1 11
age 56.90  0.94 55.0 58.8
 
Descriptive Statistics – Treatment Group 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
inactivity status   0.42  0.49 0 1
elementary 0.12  0.32 0 1
apprenticeship 0.50  0.50 0 1
high school  0.25  0.43 0 1
lower tertiary  0.01  0.09 0 1
upper tertiary  0.12  0.32 0 1
unmarried 0.04  0.20 0 1
married 0.84  0.37 0 1
widowed 0.05  0.22 0 1
divorced 0.07  0.26 0 1
before 0.25  0.43 0 1
after1 0.26  0.44 0 1
after2 0.26  0.44 0 1
after3 0.23  0.42 0 1
# of household members  2.41  0.97 1 10
age 59.72  0.78 58.25 62.25
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Annex 4: Econometric Results of the Full Baseline Model 
 
Econometric Results of the Full Baseline Model 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3 
old  0.281*** 0.275*** 0.274*** 
  (0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0147) 
after1 -0.0234*  -0.0180  -0.0205 
  (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0136) 
after2  -0.0135 -0.0110 -0.0106 
  (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0144) 
after3  -0.0223 -0.0193 -0.0223 
  (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0146) 
old_after1 -0.0159  -0.0108  -0.00922 
  (0.0180) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
old_after2 -0.0509***  -0.0340*  -0.0318* 
  (0.0179) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
old_after3 -0.0457**  -0.0354*  -0.0317 
  (0.0187) (0.0189) (0.0191) 
apprenticeship   -0.125***  -0.131*** 
   (0.0130)  (0.0131) 
high school    -0.191***  -0.188*** 
   (0.0108)  (0.0109) 
lower tertiary    -0.162***  -0.161*** 
   (0.0237)  (0.0224) 
upper tertiary    -0.250***  -0.243*** 
   (0.0076)  (0.0077) 
unmarried   0.109***  0.118*** 
   (0.0228)  (0.0231) 
widowed   0.0454**  0.0479** 
   (0.0199)  (0.0199) 
divorced   0.0377**  0.0369** 
   (0.0171)  (0.0172) 
# of household members    -0.0157***  -0.0161*** 
   (0.0045)  (0.0046) 
     
76 districts (not reported)      X 
     
Observations  50,152 50,152 50,152 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.07 0.11 0.14 
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
           *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Annex 5: Estimated Coefficients from the Probit Model in Three Different  
                Specifications (Yearly Periods) 
 
Estimated Coefficients from the Probit Model in Three Different Specifications (Yearly Periods) 
Model (1)  (2)  (3) 
OLD*AFTER1  -0.0067 -0.0033  -0.0009 
 (0.0195)  (0.0198)  (0.0199) 
OLD*AFTER2  -0.0689*** -0.0573***  -0.0564*** 
 (0.0201)  (0.0204)  (0.0203) 
OLD*AFTER3  -0.0623*** -0.0435**  -0.0366* 
 (0.0198)  (0.0204)  (0.00206) 
Personal characteristics    X  X 
District dummies      X 
N 33,842  33,842  33,842 
Pseudo R-squared  0.07  0.11  0.14 
Note: Coefficients are recalculated into the probability measure (min 0, max 1). The excluded variables are 
dummies for: control group, one period before policy change, interaction of control group and all 
periods.. Standard errors are in parentheses. 







Annex 6: Estimated Coefficients from the Probit Model in Three Different  
                Specifications (Dependent Variable – Being Employed) 
Estimated Coefficients from the Probit Model in Three Different Specifications (Dependent Variable – Being 
Employed) 
Model (1)  (2)  (3) 
OLD*AFTER1  0.0117 0.0054  0.0049 
 (0.0188)  (0.0193)  (0.0193) 
OLD*AFTER2  0.0419** 0.0226  0.0196 
 (0.0192)  (0.0198)  (0.0199) 
OLD*AFTER3  0.0467** 0.0351*  0.0312 
 (0.0197)  (0.0201)  (0.0203) 
Personal characteristics    X  X 
District dummies      X 
N 50,152  50,152  50,152 
Pseudo R-squared  0.05  0.10  0.13 
Note: Coefficients are recalculated into the probability measure (min 0, max 1). The excluded variables are 
dummies for: control group, one period before policy change, interaction of control group and all 
periods. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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